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Abstract: Following a watershed of suspected covert proliferation in Iran, legislators 
and scholars have searched for more effective ways to isolate Iran from the global 
energy market and financial systems.  Prior sanctions played a crucial role in the 
international anti-proliferation architecture, but unilateral and non-comprehensive 
multilateral embargoes failed to achieve their desired deterrent effect.  Now, with the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA), the Obama 
Administration expands extraterritorial sanctions to hold U.S. parent corporations 
liable for the sanctionable activity of their foreign subsidiaries.  While the ITRA 
marks a turning point in the sanctions game between the United States and Iran, the 
Act is unlikely to deter Iranian leaders from their nuclear program.  This Note sets 
out key risks of the ITRA’s economic, enforcement, and diplomatic approach, and 
argues that the United States, if serious about talking Iran down from the nuclear 
cliff, must look beyond its unilateral measures and engage the international 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After three decades of escalating sanctions, some compare the history 
of Iranian proliferation to the much-loved Sunday comic strip “Peanuts.”1  
The storyline is an American classic—Lucy invites Charlie Brown to kick 
the football.  When he refuses, Lucy promises to hold the ball steady, 
telling him: “This time, you can trust me.”  The reader knows that Charlie 
Brown will never kick her football, but he keeps trying as Lucy finds new 
ways to play him for a fool.  Since the dawn of the atomic age, such has 
been the relationship between Tehran and the West.  The allure of security 
and the prospect of reaching those nations that remain impervious to 
international cooperation encouraged the United States, much like Charlie 
Brown, to choose optimism over experience.  But as Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
grow dangerously close to fruition, the United States has devised a new way 
to kick Iran’s proverbial football.  With the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA),2 the Obama Administration expands 
 
1 See, e.g., Islamic Republic Pulls the Football Away from IAEA, IRAN TIMES (June 14, 2012, 4:04 
PM), http://iran-times.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4235:islamic-republic-
pulls-the-football-away-from-iaea&catid=100:whats-right&Itemid=425; Rick Moran, West Plays Charlie 
Brown to Iran’s Lucy, AM. THINKER (May 27, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/05/ 
west_plays_charlie_brown_to_irans_lucy.html. 
2 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 101 
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extraterritorial sanctions to hold U.S. parent corporations liable for the 
sanctionable activity of their foreign subsidiaries.  In doing so, the ITRA 
places extraordinary pressure on those who still conduct business with Iran, 
however indirectly, to limit their activity. 
Following a watershed of suspected covert proliferation in Iran, 
legislators and scholars have searched for more effective ways to isolate 
Iran from the global energy market and financial systems.  Prior sanctions 
played a crucial role in the international anti-proliferation architecture, but 
unilateral and non-comprehensive multilateral embargoes failed to achieve 
their desired deterrent effect.  While the ITRA marks a turning point in the 
sanctions game between the United States and Iran, the Act is unlikely to 
deter Iranian leaders from their nuclear program as “inflexibly imposed, 
escalating [American] sanctions begin to lose their value as leverage to 
elicit changes in Iranian policy.”3  The United States must now look beyond 
unilateral measures and engage the international community to develop 
multilateral sanctions that can be applied and enforced uniformly. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II recounts a brief history of the 
United Nations’ attempts to stifle proliferation threats through international 
arms limitations and disarmament agreements.  It also provides the 
background information necessary to understand the United States’ early 
efforts to sanction Iran beginning with the Reagan Administration.  This 
part explores the preexisting framework for individual and business 
liability created by the United States’ Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010.  Part III sets out key risks and, specifically, the legal, 
economic, and political implications of the ITRA’s unilateral approach.  In 
Part IV, this Note examines the virtue of engaging the international 
community as an alternative to the ITRA.  Finally, Part V argues that the 
imposition of multilateral sanctions would better serve the economic, 
enforcement, and diplomatic goals that Iran sanctions need in order to be 
truly effective. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND: CHANGING APPROACHES TO ANTI-
PROLIFERATION 
 
In many ways, the United Nations’ early efforts to curb nuclear 
proliferation in Iran through international arms limitations and 
disarmament agreements provided the United States with a preliminary 
framework for its own sanctions regime.  As a careful review of the Iran 
 
(2012) (describing Congress’s intent to “compel[] Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability and other threatening activities . . . through a comprehensive policy that includes economic 
sanctions, diplomacy, and military planning, capabilities and options”).  
3 WILLIAM LUERS ET AL., THE IRAN PROJECT, WEIGHING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 29 (2012). 
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and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 reveals, however, even as U.S. 
sanctions flowed with increasing severity, each program proved vulnerable 
to evasion and non-compliance. 
 
A.  Early International Efforts 
 
The use of sanctions dates back to ancient Greece.  As early as 432 
B.C., Pericles issued the Megarian Decree—an order restricting the entry of 
Megara products into the Athenian marketplace.4  This peacetime embargo 
brought Megara to the brink of starvation, placed significant pressure on 
Sparta to invade Athens, and ultimately triggered the Peloponnesian War.5  
Since then, sanctions continued to play an important role in military and 
diplomatic endeavors.  Often described as “collective action against a state 
considered to be violating international law,” sanctions are executed to 
“compel that state to conform [to the law].”6  These measures can be 
symbolic in nature—a boycott of international events, the refusal to extend 
diplomatic recognition—or economic-based.   
Over the last hundred years, restrictions on international trade and 
capital flows have found particular favor as international cooperatives 
sought to legitimate a more effective way to undermine the leadership of 
rogue nations.7  While economic sanctions often accompanied military 
action during the nineteenth century, following World War I these tools 
were seen as a low-risk alternative to armed conflict.8  Woodrow Wilson 
firmly believed that “[a] nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight 
of surrender.  Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and 
there will be no need for force.”9  Such was the underlying rationale for 
several U.N. resolutions inspired by World War II’s new “language of 
atomic warfare”10—measures that began to outline the collective 
 
4 Chen-yuan Tung, China’s Economic Leverage and Taiwan’s Security Concerns with Respect to 
Cross-Strait Economic Relations 93 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins 
University). 
5 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 72–73, 118 (M. I. Finley ed., Rex Warner 
trans., 1972). 
6 M. S. DAOUDI & M. S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 5–8 (1983). 
7 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 11 (1990); see also Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, Sanctions: Neither 
War nor Peace, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 187, 189 (2003) (“Formal legal discussion of the legitimacy of 
pacific blockades, or sanctions more generally, did not occur until the twentieth century with the 
formation of the League of Nations and then later of the United Nations.”). 
8 Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Sanctions, THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html. 
9 WOODROW WILSON & SAUL K. PADOVER, WILSON’S IDEALS 108 (1942). 
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953, 813, 815 (1960) [hereinafter Eisenhower Address]. 
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obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. 
In 1970, the United Nations’ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became the first binding, multilateral treaty aimed 
at arms limitation and disarmament by nuclear-weapon states.11  At its core, 
the treaty sought to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and 
complete disarmament.”12  Article II of the NPT imposed important 
restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon states as well: 
 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.13 
 
With only a few confirmed and suspected nuclear-weapon states refusing to 
sign the treaty or withdrawing from it entirely,14 the NPT’s regime created 
an international norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation. 
Still, one provision of the NPT created a conspicuous opportunity for 
circumvention: Article IV affirmed the “inalienable right of all the Parties 
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes.”15  For non-nuclear states, this caveat allowed for the 
enrichment of “natural uranium (0.7 percent U-235) to fuel grade (~3 
percent U-235)” for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.16  Article IV also 
encouraged “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy” between nuclear and non-nuclear states.17  As one observer noted: 
“From there it is a short step to weapons-grade highly enriched uranium 
 
11 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 
161 [hereinafter NPT], available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml. 
12 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNODA, http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
13 NPT, supra note 11, art. II. 
14 Non-signatory states include Israel, India, and Pakistan.  North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 
2003.  See Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/nptsigners.html (last 
updated Feb. 2012).  
15 NPT, supra note 11, art. IV. 
16 THOMAS C. REED & DANNY B. STILLMAN, THE NUCLEAR EXPRESS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
THE BOMB AND ITS PROLIFERATION 144 (2009). 
17 NPT, supra note 11, art. IV. 
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(HEU: over 90 percent U-235).”18  Even with nuclear states sharing 
technology and material in compliance with the NPT, an unconditional 
right to the peaceful application of nuclear energy brought non-nuclear 
states one step closer toward advanced bomb capability.  The “Atoms for 
Peace” program illustrates this dangerous tradeoff well. 
In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower announced to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations a plan to harness the constructive, rather 
than the destructive, use of atomic energy with a proposed International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the helm.19  He promised that “[e]xperts 
would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, 
medicine and other peaceful activities . . . to provide abundant electrical 
energy in the power-starved areas of the world.”20  Under the program, 
countries like China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Hungary, and Cuba pledged to 
forgo their development of nuclear weapons in exchange for the atomic 
equipment, facilities, and information necessary to develop and operate 
nuclear power plants.21  Iran was also a beneficiary of the IAEA’s nuclear 
transfer program subject to certain transparency and verification 
safeguards,22 and between 1986 and 1996, it was the seventh largest 
recipient of overall technical assistance.23  During its early energy 
development days, it was the United States that supplied Iran with highly 
enriched uranium and a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.24  Iran continued to 
sign non-proliferation agreements in exchange for an American supply of 
uranium, and this continued until Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 when 
the United States terminated the arrangement under President Carter.25 
 
18 REED & STILLMAN, supra note 16, at 144.  Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is considered weapons-
grade when enriched to 90 percent U-235 or higher.  See Uranium Production, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/U_production.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
19 Eisenhower Address, supra note 10, at 821; see also DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 9 (1997), available at 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf.  Under the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, which came into force on July 29, 1957, any member state could 
“request the assistance of the Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, 
equipment, and facilities” for peaceful atomic energy projects.  Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 273 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 [hereinafter IAEA Statute], available 
at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html.  To ensure the peaceful use of these nuclear resources, the 
United States implemented a system of safeguards and inspections through bilateral treaties.  See 
LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR ORDER 36 
(1987).  
20 Eisenhower Address, supra note 10, at 821. 
21 IAEA Statute, supra note 19; FISCHER, supra note 19, at 326. 
22 See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, at 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974). 
23 FISCHER, supra note 19, at 326.  
24 Semira N. Nikou, Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Activities, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
25 Id. 
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By 1998, the Clinton Administration openly announced its opposition 
to Iran’s continued nuclear energy program and the construction of light 
water power reactors despite Tehran’s insistence that its goal was energy 
production.26  While “[n]uclear technology, materials, and know-how are 
dual use in nature, meaning they have peaceful and military applications,”27 
separating a country’s peaceful intent from proliferation ambitions 
remained difficult.  With limited opportunities to police violations, the 
“Atoms for Peace” program threatened to become “atoms for war”28 and a 
focus on enforcement mechanisms soon took priority. 
Of course, the United States was not alone in its efforts.  As early as 
the mid-1970s, proliferation worries triggered the U.N. General Assembly 
to adopt formal texts like Resolution 3472, a comprehensive study on 
nuclear-weapon-free zones.29  Mindful that “nuclear-weapon-free zones 
constitute one of the most effective means of preventing the proliferation, 
both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to the 
elimination of the danger of nuclear holocaust,” the United Nations created 
“[a]n international system of verification and control” for disarmament 
norms and global nuclear non-proliferation.30  But even with regional zone 
prohibitions, inspection requirements, fact-finding mandates, and special 
enforcement protocol,31 suspected proliferation in the 1990s by countries 
like North Korea, Syria, and Iraq continued to threaten international peace 
and security.32  Both the United Nations and individual states turned to 
economic sanctions as a means of forcing non-proliferation compliance 
amidst the growing sense that the NPT and other collective security 
systems had failed.33 
To reach these new threats, targeted sanctions emerged as one of “the 
twenty-first century’s most effective and important new counterterrorism 
and counterproliferation tools” for obstructing illegitimate nuclear 
 
26 Id. 
27 MATTHEW FUHRMANN, ATOMIC ASSISTANCE: HOW “ATOMS FOR PEACE” PROGRAMS CAUSE 
NUCLEAR INSECURITY 2 (2012). 
28 Id. at 1. 
29 G.A. Res. 3472, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3472(XXX) [A-B] (Dec. 11, 1975). 
30 Id.  For a list of U.N. treaties related to nuclear-weapon-free zones including the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Bangkok, the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Treaty on a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, see Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, UNODA, http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
31 Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Comparative Chart, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., 
cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmnwfzc.pdf (last updated May 5, 2011). 
32 The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984. 
33 See, e.g., Steve H. Hanke, On the Failure of the Iranian Sanctions, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/ 
publications/commentary/failure-iranian-sanctions (last visited July 24, 2013) (noting that “sanctions have 
failed to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program” and that “sanctions have a long history of 
failure”). 
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programs.34  With the United Nations’ ongoing focus on curbing zones of 
proliferation, the case for harsher economic sanctions against Iran gained 
momentum following a string of reports issued by IAEA and the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.35  By 
2011, few could deny that Iran had continued to pursue an illicit nuclear 
program despite unilateral and multilateral regulation.36  Based on credible 
evidence provided by Iran, Member States, and the IAEA’s own research, 
an Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 Report concluded, for 
the first time and with unprecedented certainty, that Iran has pursued 
activities “that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive 
device . . . .”37  On September 13, 2012, the IAEA passed a resolution 
expressing “serious concerns” about Iran’s nuclear program and scolded 
the country for defying U.N. Security Council resolutions that required the 
suspension of all uranium enrichment.38 
Given this growing body of evidence, some argue that “Iran has yet to 
be meaningfully sanctioned” for any of these violations39 and “that the price 
the international community has exacted from this regime for its violations 
has thus far been remarkably low.”40  Some blame the absence of strict 
sanctions on Iran’s economic relationship with countries like China and 
India,41 while others cite a lack of “superpower” initiative and cooperation 
with the IAEA.42  As the following section explains, however, the United 
 
34 Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial 
Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 789, 819 (2009). 
35 U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
36 Director General, Atoms for Peace, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, 
GOV/2011/65, para. 43 (Nov. 8, 2011) (citing evidence of Iran’s efforts to “procure nuclear related and 
dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities,” to “develop undeclared 
pathways for the production of nuclear material,” to acquire “nuclear weapons development information 
and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network,” and to create “an indigenous design of 
a nuclear weapon including the testing of components”). 
37 Id. para. 43.  
38 Steve Hunegs & Pirouz Irani, Setting the Record Straight After Ahmadinejad’s U.N. Speech, 
MINNPOST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/09/setting-record-straight-
after-ahmadinejads-un-speech. 
39 Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce 
Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 520 (2007). 
40 Id. at 548. 
41 Timothy Gardner & Roberta Rampton, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to China and 
India, REUTERS (DEC. 8, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/usa-iran-sanctons-india-idINDE 
E8B60DB20121207; Timothy Gardner, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to 11 Countries, 
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usa-iran-sanctions-idUSBRE 
92C0YQ20130314; Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann, The Coming Collapse of Iran Sanctions, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/ 
iran-sanctions_b_2758738.html. 
42 Jamie Lang, International Sanctions: The Pressure on Iran to Abandon Nuclear Proliferation, 6 
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 141, 166 (2007). 
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States began levying transaction regulations on Iran for a number of 
reasons, including Iran’s active pursuit of nuclear capability, as early as the 
Reagan Administration. 
 
B.  The Birth of an American Framework 
 
1.  Foundations: The 1996 Sanctions Act and 2010 Comprehensive 
Sanctions Act  
 
The U.S. government has implemented several programs aimed at 
restricting market access for individuals and companies engaged in Iranian 
commercial transactions.  For example, under Executive Order 12613, 
President Reagan issued an import embargo on Iranian goods and services 
pursuant to Section 505 of the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985.43  In 1995, President Clinton tightened sanctions 
with Executive Order 1295744 and Executive Order 12959.45  Pursuant to 
the statutory authority of the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 198146 and the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act of 1977,47 all U.S. persons were prohibited from participating 
in Iranian petroleum development.48 
Congress soon passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (1996 
Sanctions Act), a measure that authorized the President to impose sanctions 
on individuals and foreign financial institutions knowingly engaged in new 
economic transactions valued in excess of $40,000,000 “that directly and 
significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop 
petroleum resources of Iran.”49  For the first time, the U.S. government 
targeted specific industries in the Iranian marketplace under the assumption 
that “limiting the development of Iran’s and Libya’s petroleum resources 
would deny them the revenues produced by such resources and thereby 
deprive them of the financial means to support acts of international 
 
43 Exec. Order No. 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29, 1987) (applying to all goods or services of 
Iranian origin except “(a) Iranian-origin publications and materials imported for news publications or 
news broadcast dissemination; (b) petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country; 
[and] (c) articles imported directly from Iran into the United States that were exported from Iran prior to 
the effective date of [Executive Order 12613]”).  
44 Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995) (prohibiting any U.S. person or 
entity from developing petroleum resources in Iran). 
45 Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995) (expanding previous sanctions on 
Iran to include a total investment and trade embargo). 
46 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat. 
1519 (1981). 
47 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (1977). 
48 An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions Against Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY  
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.txt. 
49 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996). 
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terrorism.”50  By 1997, the Clinton Administration’s sanction regime 
banned virtually all investment and commercial activity with Iran.51 
In light of Iran’s suspected clandestine nuclear program, Congress 
amended the 1996 Sanctions Act to impose economic sanctions in September 
of 2010.  With the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act (2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act), Congress banned 
investments of $20,000,000 or more that supported the development of 
petroleum resources in Iran.52  Restrictions also included the selling, 
leasing, or provision of “goods, services, technology, information, or 
support” that contributed to “the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s 
domestic production of refined petroleum products, including any direct 
and significant assistance with respect to the construction, modernization, 
or repair of petroleum refineries.”53  Finally, the 2010 Comprehensive 
Sanctions Act authorized the President to impose sanctions on any 
individual or entity for selling or providing Iran with refined petroleum 
products over a certain value.54  There was still a prohibition on the 
importation of all goods, services, and technologies of Iranian origin, with 
few exceptions.55 
The United States’ current sanctions policy was born out of the 1996 
and 2010 Acts, where, for the first time, individuals and businesses could 
be held liable for a very specific class of commercial transactions with Iran.  
These new restrictions marked an aggressive attempt to persuade Tehran to 
address growing concerns about its prohibited nuclear activities, and the 
State Department believed that the imposition of sanctions on non-
American companies for supporting Iran’s energy sector “sen[t] a stern and 
clear message to companies around the world” about the consequence of 
non-compliance.56  By 2010, foreign companies had a choice: sever 
business ties with Iran or lose access to the American financial and 
commercial marketplace.  The U.S. government based this new foreign 
policy tool on three primary objectives: 
 
(1) [T]o block the transfer of weapons, components, technology, 
and dual-use items to Iran’s prohibited nuclear and missile 
programs; (2) to target select sectors of the Iranian economy 
 
50 Richard G. Alexander, Note, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Congress Exceeds Its 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601, 1602 (1997). 
51 Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997). 
52 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th 
Cong. § 102 (2010). 
53 Id. (applying to “goods, services, technology, information, or support” with a “fair market value 
of $1,000,000 or more”). 
54 Id. § 102(a)(3)(A)(i). 
55 Id. § 103 (information materials, humanitarian aid, transactions incidental to travel).  
56 Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm. 
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relevant to its proliferation activities; and (3) to induce Iran to 
engage constructively, through discussions with the United 
States, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Russia . . . to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations.57 
 
While prior sanction programs reflected “a cumulative effort by the 
United States to prevent money laundering and illicit transactions that 
endanger United States national security,”58 there was a growing sense that 
“[d]ue diligence and audits for correspondent banking with foreign 
financial institutions [might] not be sufficient to protect against industrious 
Iranian actors.”59  The 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act relied “heavily 
on self-reporting, including user certifications based on the best knowledge 
of United States financial institutions, which [could] be deceived by ever-
shifting front companies and evasive measures by Iran.”60 
Furthermore, American corporations escaped liability for the Iranian 
transactions of their foreign affiliates if neither the American firm nor a 
United States citizen was involved in the prohibited activity.  For example, 
following a May 2011 determination that Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
had violated the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act by delivering “at least 
two cargoes of reformate to Iran . . . worth approximately $50 million,”61 
the Obama Administration clarified that 2010 Act restrictions did not apply 
to U.S.-based subsidiaries (like CITGO, an American affiliate operated by 
PDVSA).62 
Section 102(g) further narrowed the economic impact of the Act, 
which included a “special rule” giving the President discretion over all 
sanction determinations.63  To avoid liability under the 2010 Comprehensive 
Sanctions Act, a firm need only take “significant verifiable steps toward 
stopping the activity” and provide “reliable assurances” that they will not 
engage in any future prohibited activity.64  A number of energy investment 
 
57 Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2012).  
58 Jennifer M. Kline, Comment, When Comprehensive Falls Short: The Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 219, 252 (2011). 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act, supra note 56.  Venezuela 
subsequently branded PDVSA’s designation under the Comprehensive Sanctions Act as a violation of 
international law and an “imperialistic aggression” by the United States.  See Posición del Gobierno 
Bolivariano ante Sanciones de EE.UU. Contra PDVSA, PARTIDO SOCIALISTA UNIDO DE VENEZUELA (May 
25, 2011), http://www.psuv.org.ve/temas/comunicados/posicion-gobierno-bolivariano-ante-sanciones-eeuu-
contra-pdvsa/. 
62 Briefing on the Latest Sanctions on Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 24, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164170.htm. 
63  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th 
Cong. § 102(g) (2010). 
64 Id.   
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companies also received exemptions under this “special rule,” including 
Total of France, Statoil of Norway, ENI of Italy, Royal Dutch Shell of 
Britain and the Netherlands, and Inpex of Japan.65  Consequently, 
policymakers realized that the 1996 Sanctions Act and the 2010 
Comprehensive Sanctions Act were anything but ironclad, and several 
members of the 112th Congress began to advocate for new methods of 
enforcement.66  President Obama also made security interests, including 
Iran’s nuclear program, a central theme in his 2012 State of the Union 
Address.67  New sanctions on Iran soon followed. 
 
2.  New Restrictions Under the ITRA 
 
On August 10, 2012, President Obama signed the ITRA, a bipartisan 
bill that expands the scope and severity of prohibitions against Iran while 
increasing the number of companies that are now subject to those 
sanctions.68  Unlike its predecessors’ inability to tie non-U.S. subsidiary 
violations back to an American parent company, the ITRA authorizes the 
President to take action against the parent corporation of a foreign firm that 
engages in any of the following transactions with Iran: (1) joint ventures 
related to the development of petroleum resources or the mining, 
production, or transportation of uranium, (2) the transportation of Iranian 
crude oil, (3) the concealment of crude oil or refined petroleum products of 
Iranian origin, (4) the provision of underwriting or insurance or reinsurance 
services, or (5) the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance 
of Iranian debt.69  The ITRA also amends Section 13 of the Securities and 
 
65 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 15 (2013).  
66 See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Congress Clears New Sanctions on Doing Business with Iran, BUS. WK. 
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-01/congress-clears-new-sanctions-on-
doing-business-with-iran (quoting comments by Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, declaring the Iranian energy sector “off limits” and urging Congress to “stop Iran 
before it’s too late”); Congress Takes Aim at Iran’s Nuclear Program, Oil Income with New Sanctions, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57485099/congress-takes-
aim-at-irans-nuclear-program-oil-income-with-new-sanctions/ (referencing comments by Senator Tim 
Johnson, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, about faltering “negotiations between the West 
and Iran over its uranium enrichment”).  
67 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 
2012), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/25/2012-
state-union-address-enhanced-version#transcript (“And we will safeguard America’s own security 
against those who threaten our citizens, our friends, and our interests.  Look at Iran.  Through the power 
of our diplomacy, a world that was once divided about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program now 
stands as one.  The regime is more isolated than ever before; its leaders are faced with crippling 
sanctions, and as long as they shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent.  Let there be no 
doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options 
off the table to achieve that goal.”). 
68 See generally Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
69 Id. 
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Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers of stock traded on U.S. exchanges 
to disclose any activity by it or an affiliate that violates the new sanctions 
law.70  Companies must now report on an annual or quarterly basis any 
instance of prohibited activity by it or any of its affiliates, and these 
disclosures must contain a “detailed description of each such activity, 
including—(A) the nature and extent of the activity; (B) the gross revenues 
and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and (C) whether the 
issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue 
the activity.”71  Furthermore, while an entity must “knowingly” engage in 
prohibited activity in order to trigger a violation under the ITRA, an 
unwitting U.S. parent company can potentially be liable for its failure to 
report any violations by a foreign subsidiary or affiliate that it owns or 
controls.72  Following the SEC’s periodic reporting and public disclosure of 
any sanctionable activities, the President is then required to complete a 
sanctions determination within 180 days after beginning an investigation.73 
Elsewhere, the ITRA modifies the President’s authority to issue 
compliance waivers or suspensions.  Under Section 9(c) of the 1996 
Sanctions Act, the President could waive sanctions when it was 
“important” to the United States’ national interest.74  Under Section 102(c) 
of the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act, waivers were reserved for 
instances deemed “necessary” to preserve the national interest.75  After the 
ITRA, however, waiver authority for energy-related sanctions includes 
only those instances “essential to national security interests.”76  The 
“weapons of mass destruction” standard has also been limited to only those 
 
70 Id. § 219.  The ITRA specifically amends Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by 
adding a new subsection outlining 10-K and 10-Q form disclosure requirements for “certain activities 
relating to Iran.”  Notably, Section 13(r) of the 1934 Act contains no materiality threshold or de 
minimums exceptions.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  Under Section 218, a parent company’s ownership over “a partnership, association, trust, 
joint venture, corporation, or other organization” is deemed sufficient for the purposes of the ITRA if it 
holds “more than 50 percent of the equity interest by vote or value,” it maintains “a majority of seats on 
the board of directors,” or it exercises significant “control [over] the actions, policies, or personnel 
decisions of the entity.”  Id. § 218(a).  The ITRA defers to the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act’s 
definition of “knowingly,” which finds actual knowledge, or knowledge that a person should have 
known, sufficient for parent company liability.  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th Cong. § 101(6) (2010).  
73 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 219 
(2012). 
74 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. § 9(c)(1) (1996) (“The President 
may waive the requirement in [S]ection 5 to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person . . . 30 days or 
more after the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is 
important to the national interest of the United States to exercise such waiver authority.”).  The 
President was required to include a “specific and detailed rationale for [his] determination” in any 
Section 9(c)(1) report.  Id. § 9(c)(2). 
75 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 § 102(c). 
76 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 205. 
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waivers that are “vital to the national security interests.”77  These 
restrictions, coupled with new SEC disclosure requirements under Section 
219 of the ITRA, signal a substantial broadening of the United States’ 
sanctions regime.78 
The ITRA threatens to restrict a non-compliant company’s access to 
the U.S. market, but it also exposes principals and corporate officers to 
sanctions and direct civil penalties in their individual capacity.79  Under the 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, it is “unlawful for a person to violate, 
attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any license, 
order, regulation, or prohibition issued.”80  Such violations can result in a 
civil penalty of $250,000 or “an amount that is twice the amount of the 
transaction that is the basis of the violation.”81  These new penalties surely 
incentivize institutional and individual compliance, but as Part III explains, 
the corresponding legal, economic, and diplomatic implications of the 
ITRA cast a dark shadow on its efficacy. 
 
III.  PRACTICAL AND POLICAL TROUBLES OF THE ITRA 
 
A.  Exceptionalism and the Extraterritoriality of American Sanctions 
Law 
 
Before the ITRA’s practical implications for corporate liability, 
compliance, and social externalities can be determined, one must first 
examine the Act’s extraterritorial application.  Often, the United States’ 
ambitious attempt to direct the actions of foreign actors and impose 
sanctions for non-compliance is accompanied by questions of legitimacy.82  
When the government began regulating individuals and entities with no 
connection to the United States under the 1996 Sanctions Act, some viewed 
the government’s expanded view of extraterritorial jurisdiction as 
“unreasonable and a contradiction of the central precept of international 
law that all nations are of equal status.”83  Just as the 1996 Sanctions Act 
 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., What Public Companies Need to Know About Broadened Sanctions and New SEC 
Reporting Requirements Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, GIBSON DUNN 
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/BroadenedSanctions-NewSEC-
Reporting-Requirements-Iran-Syria.pdf. 
79 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 218. 
80 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (1977).  
81 Id. § 1705(b). 
82 See, e.g., Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. 
Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1987); Ray Takeyh & Suzanne Maloney, The Self-Limiting 
Success of Iran Sanctions, 87 INT’L AFF. 1297, 1301–05 (2011). 
83 Alexander, supra note 50, at 1634.  See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasizing the fundamental importance of sovereign equality 
in international law precepts). 
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and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act found validity under domestic law, 
however, so too might the ITRA. 
Although Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of U.S. 
citizens, both inside the territorial boundaries of the United States and 
abroad, there remains a general assumption that Congress legislates with a 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.84  This 
canon concerns the undesirable conflict between American domestic law 
and that of other sovereign states, but the presumption is overcome where 
Congress has expressed an intent to extend the application of federal law 
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.85  Unlike other securities-related law 
where the Supreme Court has found statutory language insufficient to 
overcome this presumption against extraterritorial application,86 economic 
sanctions like the 1996 Sanctions Act and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions 
Act invoke the authority of the Emergency Economic Powers Act or rely 
on direct congressional authorization to justify their extraterritoriality.  
Both Acts included express extraterritorial provisions, and both statutes 
track a growing trend toward the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
sanction law that began, perhaps most notably, with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977.87 
As for the Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President of the 
United States has the power to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary 
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United 
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such 
threat.”88  This authority includes the ability to regulate or prohibit financial 
transactions or transfers in the United States.89  Furthermore, when the 
extraterritoriality of the Emergency Economic Powers Act was subsequently 
challenged in 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s broad 
authority to act in Dames & Moore v. Regan.90  There, Justice Rehnquist 
interpreted the statute to include “congressional acceptance of a broad 
scope for executive action” during national security, foreign policy, or 
 
84 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.”). 
85 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). 
86 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (noting that “there is 
no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially” and thus finding no 
extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
87 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 
818 (2009) (“[T]he number of U.S. lawsuits where American laws are applied extraterritorially to solve 
global problems has grown.  This trend, however, is not peculiar to the United States.  Increasingly 
other countries are also applying their laws extraterritorially to exert international influence and solve 
transboundary challenges.”). 
88 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977). 
89 Id. § 1702. 
90 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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In the case of Iran, the U.S. government has frequently used the 
Emergency Economic Powers Act’s extraterritorial reach to levy sanctions 
on Tehran via executive order.92  This began after the 1979 Iran hostage 
crisis, when the country was named a threat to national security and more 
than $12 billion in Iranian government assets—assets that were under the 
control of U.S. individuals or entities—were cut off under the Carter 
Administration.93  Since then, Presidents have used their emergency power 
to impose targeted economic sanctions and block Iranian assets that flow 
through American financial institutions and their subsidiaries.  Analogous 
legislation usually followed.94  A prominent example of the expanding 
application of authority under the Emergency Economic Powers Act came 
soon after September 11, 2001.  When President Bush signed Executive 
Order 13224, he authorized a bar on U.S. transactions with entities found to 
be supporting international acts of terrorism.95  The order also named and 
sanctioned certain Iranian-linked financial institutions connected with 
Tehran’s nuclear program.96  By 2005, the President had the authority to 
freeze the assets of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their 
supporters via the Emergency Economic Powers Act and other related 
statutes.97 
With the seeds of extraterritorial sanctions sown, the gradual 
expansion of jurisdiction continued in other areas of federal law as well.  
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, American corporations and their 
officers were prohibited from making bribes to foreign officials.98  In 1998, 
amendments to the Act extended its jurisdiction beyond the territorial 
United States, and for the first time, subjected foreign nationals and entities 
to prosecution.99  Over the years, the Department of Justice has been 
relatively successful in its efforts to target foreign corporations under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  For instance, in 2008 the Department of 
Justice reached an $800 million settlement with German company Siemens 
for the $1.7 billion in kickbacks that four of its subsidiaries paid to Iraqi 
 
91 Id. at 656.  This decision, though several decades before Morrison, underscores the difference in 
Court deference when it comes to issues of national security (rather than mere securities regulation). 
92 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (President Jimmy Carter); 
Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995) (President William J. Clinton); Exec. 
Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995) (President William J. Clinton); Exec. Order No. 
13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (President George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13574, 76 
Fed. Reg. 30,505 (May 23, 2011) (President Barack Obama). 
93 Robert Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 247 (1981). 
94 For example, the enactment of 1996 sanctions under President Clinton followed Executive 
Orders 12957 and 12959. 
95 Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 § 1 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
96 Id. 
97 Exec. Order No. 13382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 § 1 (June 28, 2001). 
98 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006). 
99 Id. § 78dd-3. 
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officials in exchange for contracts.100  In 2010, the Department of Justice 
similarly accused British defense contractor BAE Systems PLC of 
misreporting compliance and creating shell companies to conceal the bribes 
it made to Saudi officials in exchange for a profitable fighter jet contract.101  
BAE paid the United States $400 million over the charges.102  More 
recently, Pfizer agreed to pay $60.2 million in fines after the multinational 
pharmaceutical giant was charged with bribing officials in eight countries—
including China, Italy, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Russia—to approve and use its 
drugs.103  In all of these instances, the U.S. government fortified its position 
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act applies to non-U.S. entities for bribes 
made anywhere, even when there has been no participation by a U.S. 
affiliate.  From the Justice Department’s perspective, all that Congress 
requires is some connection with the United States.104  A comparable 
justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction has been applied to sanctions 
law, and the ITRA appears to sit comfortably among these invocations of 
extraterritorial legal authority even if it stretches foreign jurisdiction to new 
limits. 
Not surprisingly, however, the extraterritorial application of economic 
sanctions has long caused tension between international law and the United 
States’ counter-proliferation efforts.105  While the U.N. Charter does 
authorize the Security Council to call upon member states to use the 
“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations”106 to quell “any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”107 the Charter itself is rooted in 
 
100 Erin Fuchs, The Largest-Ever Corporate Payouts to the US Over Foreign Bribery Charges, 




103 SEC Charges Pfizer with FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-152.htm; Pratap Chatterjee, Pfizer Admits Bribery in Eight 
Countries, CORPWATCH (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15765. 
104 This interpretation is not unfounded.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (making it “unlawful for any 
issuer organized under the laws of the United States . . . or for any United States person that is an 
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such 
issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the United States”).  The Act prohibits issuers from making offers 
or payments to any foreign official for influence of inducement purposes.  Id. § 78dd-1.  
105 Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
56-57 (2001) (arguing that extraterritorial measures “have long been criticized as violating [traditional 
public international law] principles, since they purport to exercise authority over foreign states and 
entities for engaging in conduct (business with third countries) that has no jurisdictional nexus with the 
sanctioning state”); Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1249 
(2011) (citing protests and WTO proceedings initiated by the European Union following the passage of 
the United States’ 1996 Sanctions Act). 
106 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
107 Id. art. 39. 
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principles of sovereign equality.108  Under this theory of nation-state 
autonomy, the 1996 Sanctions Act was met with overwhelming 
condemnation and characterization as an encroachment on customary 
international law.109  Prior to the ITRA, the U.S. government appeared more 
sensitive to these claims: due to heavy protest by the European Union, for 
example, the government refrained from imposing 1996 sanctions on 
European firms that conducted business in Iran and Libya.110  Given further 
limitations on presidential discretion under the ITRA,111 however, future 
waivers will likely be less forthcoming. 
Now, even amidst heavy disapproval from countries like China and 
Russia, the United States has wholeheartedly embraced the extraterritorial 
application of the ITRA.112  Leaders in Tehran condemn the Act’s coercive 
penalties,113 of course, but it remains unlikely that the United Nations or 
any other international authority will mount a successful anti-sanctions 
campaign against the legitimacy of the ITRA.  Even the European Union, 
once strongly opposed to the United States’ extraterritorial regulations, has 
taken a similar maximalist approach after recently expressing “serious and 
deepening concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme.”114  In October of 
2012, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union placed “additional 
restrictive measures in the financial, trade, energy, and transport sectors” 
and “prohibit[ed] all transactions between European and Iranian banks.”115  
At first blush, this development and others appear to be good news for the 
United States’ broad economic isolation strategy.  But with the emergence 
of separate U.S., European, and U.N. sanction frameworks, many firms 
find themselves caught between conflicting standards of compliance.116  
 
108 Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
109 Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 929 
(2009) (noting that the 1996 sanctions “were vehemently condemned as ‘extraterritorially’ illegal by the 
U.S.’s major trading partners, some of whom enacted their own retaliatory laws to block or offset any 
damage to their companies’ business interests”). 
110 See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS (2013); Charles 
Tait Graves, Extraterritoriality and Its Limits: The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 21 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 715, 722 (1998). 
111 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
112 Stephen Lendman, U.S. Sanctions on Iran Mockery of Rule of Law, TEHRAN TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2012 3:21 PM), http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/100281 (arguing that the ITRA 
imposes “illegitimate sanctions on Iran” and “mocks rule of law legitimacy”). 
113 Id. 
114 COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON IRAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132833.pdf. 
115 Id.  
116 E.g., S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) (banning the provision of military-
related materials, training, financing, and other assistance but giving member states considerable 
latitude in the implementation and exercise of various asset control, inspection, and seizure activities); 
Security Council Adopts Fourth Round of Iranian Sanctions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 518 (2010) 
(citations omitted) (The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 requires “arduous 
negotiations, [but] its sanctions are weaker than those initially sought by the United States and some 
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This uncertainty, coupled with the ITRA’s new monitoring and reporting 
costs, places a tremendous burden on American parent companies. 
 
B.  Reporting Challenges and the Difficulty with Unilateral 
Enforcement 
 
Although financial reporting requirements are not new in the United 
States, Section 219 of the ITRA does pose significant challenges for 
companies that conduct business in the Middle East, especially banking 
institutions, shippers, and insurers.117  Of particular concern is the Act’s 
“knowingly” requirement.  Not only does knowing engagement in 
prohibited activities under the 1996 Sanctions Act and the 2010 
Comprehensive Sanctions Act trigger a violation under the ITRA, Section 
219 requires that corporations report instance of prohibited activity by any 
of its affiliates as well.118  The trouble with this disclosure requirement, 
however, is that the term “knowingly” as defined by the ITRA, 2010 
Comprehensive Sanctions Act, and 1996 Sanctions Act “with respect to 
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual 
knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the 
result.”119  The test for what a parent company “should have known” has 
been left intentionally vague by Congress, and the unresolved question of 
what precisely creates liability (management oversight, control flaws, etc.) 
encourages cautious over-reporting.  Intuitively, an entity’s best defense is 
massive due diligence—an endeavor that requires companies to “check 
their ability to produce, maintain and retrieve evidence of such due 
diligence.”120 
Companies must also implement and maintain internal detection and 
reporting systems that build on those already required for various securities 
laws.  In circumstances where the capacity to track certain transactions for 
both a parent company and its affiliates is lacking, the ITRA requires 
immediate compliance regardless of burden or cost.  But a firm’s ability to 
 
like-minded European allies (notably France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).”).  The European 
Union imposes its own sanctions on Iran, but those restrictions still allow Iran to use foreign-held euros.  
U.S. Senators Call on EU to Tighten Iran Sanctions on Eve of Talks, PRESSTV (Feb. 26, 2013, 6:15 
AM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/02/26/290849/us-urges-eu-to-tighten-iran-sanctions/ (“In a 
letter to President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on [February 25, 2013], 36 US 
senators urged the union to close ‘a significant loophole in US-EU sanctions policy’ in order to increase 
pressure on Iran.”). 
117 See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 219 
(2012). 
118 Id. 
119 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th 
Cong. § 101 (2010). 
120 David Savage & Kate Hill, The Iran Threat Reduction Act—Insurers and Reinsurers Beware, 
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b232505-d27a-48d3-
b5b3-1805b09d180d. 
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obtain and disclose information about its foreign affiliates can be incredibly 
difficult, especially when a parent corporation has technical ownership over 
a distant, third-party affiliate entity but no actual control.121  No matter how 
the issue is framed, liability exposure for multinational corporations and 
international business executives is vast, even amid good-faith vigilance 
and compliance efforts.  At bottom, the most any firm can do is review its 
internal monitoring and reporting system to ensure that it captures all Iran-
related activities, and do it quickly.  The ITRA’s safe harbor period (which 
allowed entities or individuals to avoid civil penalties if they terminated 
ITRA-prohibited transactions within 180 days after its enactment) ended on 
February 6, 2013.122 
Finally, an increase in the number of entities covered by the ITRA, 
coupled with a surge in the volume of new reporting, forces the 
government rely heavily on the information supplied to it.  This is 
especially true with respect to foreign firms, where the U.S. government’s 
access to financial information and evidence sufficient to initiate an 
enforcement action remains limited.123  On this basis, many foreign firms 
have an incentive to under-report.  Thus, the ITRA appears to overstep the 
U.S. government’s capacity to monitor and fully enforce the statute’s terms 
in an even-handed way.  Given the regulatory scheme and the high cost of 
compliance, the question remains: are the ITRA’s unilateral restrictions 
worth it?  The next section considers the Act’s corresponding effect on 
Iran’s currency, food staples, and low-income families. 
 
C.  The Impact of Sanctions on Iran’s Domestic Economy 
 
Also present in the ITRA debate—apart from extraterritorial issues 
and the challenges faced by private firms amidst broadening liability and 
reporting requirements—is an agenda that undervalues the impact of these 
new economic restrictions on ordinary Iranian citizens.124  While it is too 
early to determine whether the ITRA will finally curb Iran’s nuclear 
program, history suggests that regardless of their cost, Tehran will not be 
 
121 New Requirements for SEC Reporting Companies to Disclose Certain Iran-Related Activities 
and Transactions, SKADDEN SEC. REGULATION & COMPLIANCE ALERT (Oct. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-requirements-for-sec-reporting-comp-53312/. 
122 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 218(d) 
(specifying that civil penalties do not apply if a United States person or entity “divests or terminates its 
business with the entity not later than the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act”). 
123 Michael Volkov, Sanctions Violations, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/2012/09/sanctions-violations.html. 
124 Amir Salehzadeh, A View from Inside Iran: What Sanctions Do to Real People, POLICYMIC 
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/60541/a-view-from-inside-iran-what-sanctions-do-
to-real-people. 
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discouraged from its nuclear ambitions.125  Still, the new prohibitions strike 
at the heart of Iran’s vital energy sector, which provides approximately 
80% of the country’s export revenues.126  At the beginning of October 
2012, Iran’s rial lost more than 25% of its value against the dollar.127  Since 
the end of last year, Iranian currency has depreciated by over 80% as the 
price of staples like vegetables, milk, and bread has doubled.128  Pervasive 
unemployment, essential medicine shortages, and even food riots have also 
been reported.129  As one commentator notes, “[o]rdinary Iranians 
completely unconnected to the government have had their lives effectively 
ground to a halt as the sudden and unprecedented collapse of the financial 
system has rendered any meaningful form of commerce effectively 
impossible.”130 
This begs the question of whether, as a policy matter, the ITRA’s 
implications for human suffering can and should be justified.  Former 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked this question in 1996 
(when similar financial sanctions were imposed on Iraq), and she 
concluded: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the 
price is worth it.”131  The growing threat of a nuclear-armed Iran likely 
engenders a similar attitude from within the Obama Administration.  For 
example, just as the rial began to lose much of its value in the fall of 2012, 
then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton blamed Iran’s financial struggles on 
the choices of its own government, not ITRA sanctions.132  Secretary 
Clinton also eluded to a remedy “in short order” if Iran backed down from 
its disputed nuclear program, but made no mention of whether a severe dip 
in the Iranian standard of living could also trigger some kind of 
alleviation.133 
Additionally, the misery of an entire population, while limited in its 
direct effect on Iranian political leaders, poses another challenge by stifling 
 
125 A Red Line and a Reeling Rial: Sanctions May be Taking Their Toll as Israel’s Prime Minister 
Tries to Set a New Red Line to Block Iran’s Nuclear Plans, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2012) [hereafter A Red 
Line and a Reeling Rial], http://www.economist.com/node/21564229; BIJAN KHAJEHPOUR ET AL., 
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL, “NEVER GIVE IN AND NEVER GIVE UP”: THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON 
TEHRAN’S NUCLEAR CALCULATIONS 26 (Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://www.niacouncil.org/ 
site/DocServer/Never_give_in__never_give_up.pdf?docID=1941 (“No data suggests that Iran’s nuclear 
program overall has slowed down over the course of the past four years.  Iran’s stockpile of low 
enriched uranium (LEU) has grown from 839kg in November 2008 to 8271kg in February 2013 . . . .”). 




130 Murtaza Hussain, Sanctioning Society: From Iraq to Iran, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210373854792889.html. 
131 60 Minutes: Punishing Saddam (CBS television broadcast May 12, 1996). 
132 Clinton: Sanctions Can be Eased if Iran Cooperates, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/ 
IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=286514. 
133 Id. 
 ANDERSON_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:21 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 




resources for societal change.134  According to a report from the 
International Civil Society Action Network, “[t]he urban middle class that 
has historically played a central role in creating change and promoting 
progress in Iran are key casualties of the sanctions regime.”135  If one goal 
of the ITRA is to force political change by making Iran’s economic 
environment unbearable, perhaps the harsh regulation’s “unintended” 
consequences are anything but accidental.136  Unfortunately, an absence of 
market stability may have the undesirable consequence of limiting 
activities related to, or driving ordinary Iranian citizens away from, the 
democratic movement.137  This is especially true if the events in Iran unfold 
as Israel’s former Minister of Finance, Yuval Steinitz, predicts.138  By the 
end of the year, he believes that the ITRA and other sanctions will cause 
the Iranian government to lose a minimum of $45 billion in oil revenues,139 
a significant hit for an industry that brought in $69 billion in net estimated 
export revenue in 2012.  If this brings the Iranian economy to the verge of 
collapse and Tehran still refuses to comply with international non-
proliferation mandates, alternative diplomatic solutions may be foreclosed 
as nations like Israel grow increasingly impatient and threaten imminent 
military action. 
 
IV.  MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS: THE COMPREHENSIVE 
SOLUTION TO A UNILATERAL DILEMMA 
 
With major economic powers now determined to squeeze the air out 
of the Iranian economy, the underlying objective—to maintain peace and 
security in the atomic age—remains a legitimate one.  The threat of nuclear 
proliferation, like other conspicuous struggles in American and world 
history, is “not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are 
 
134 Mohammad Sadeghi Esfahlani & Jamal Abdi, Sanctions Cripple Iran’s Middle Class, Not the 
Regime, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 2, 2012), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/02/sanctions_ 
cripple_irans_middle_class_not_the_regime. 
135 ICAN, KILLING THEM SOFTLY: THE STARK IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE LIVES OF ORDINARY 
IRANIANS 6 (2012). 
136 In a recent interview with Charlie Rose, for example, Madeleine Albright said that she believed 
the ITRA sanctions were “working because we hear an awful lot about problems within the Iranian 
economy.”  This suggests that “problems” are precisely the aim of the United States’ coercive economic 
strategy.  See Press Release, CBS News, Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Says Sanctions 
Against Iran “Are Working” – on “CBS This Morning” (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.cbspressexpress.com/ 
cbs-news/releases/view?id=34652.  But see KHAJEHPOUR ET AL., supra note 125, at 14 (“Supreme 
Leader Khamenei has remained steadfast in his approach to sanctions.  The escalating sanctions regime 
has enabled him to strengthen a powerful pre-existing narrative that portrays Western powers as a 
brutal, immoral group of governments out to ‘get’ Iran, and that their core interest is to keep Iran 
underdeveloped and dependent.”). 
137 Esfahlani & Abdi, supra note 134. 
138 A Red Line and a Reeling Rial, supra note 125. 
139 Id. 
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virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to 
the end of time, by the proceedings now.”140  Thus, the need for an 
immediate, non-violent resolution to Iran’s runaway nuclear program will 
likely take precedent over general claims of sovereign equality and 
independence.  The following section explores the virtue of engaging the 
international community as an alternative to the ITRA or similar sanctions, 
highlighting opportunities for enhanced compliance, improved reporting 
and enforcement, and the reinvigoration of diplomatic negotiations. 
 
A.  Enhanced Compliance Through International Agreements 
 
It remains true that the ITRA’s broad extraterritorial application 
creates a strong disincentive for firms to provide energy-related services, 
insurance, and shipping assistance to Iran.  But China, India, and Russia 
have long expressed dismay over the imposition of unilateral sanctions.141  
Even before the ITRA became law, each pushed for, and received, 
temporary exemptions based on their own economic interests.142  This trend 
continues as the ITRA’s all-inclusive approach makes compliance 
unworkable in the face of some countries’ refusal to accept them.  In the 
absence of an exemption or temporary reprieve, foreign firms are left to 
weigh the relative payoff between evasion and acquiescence.  Early 
indications suggest that some entities have already chosen non-compliance.  
For instance, nearly three months after the ITRA became law, the China 
Classification Society continued to provide certification services to 
sanctioned Iranian maritime vessels.143  Some Russian shipping companies 
have also sustained certification services for Iranian vessels in defiance of 
the ITRA.144  The trouble with this kind of non-cooperation, of course, is 
that these countries are “directly facilitating the ability of the Iranian 
regime to circumvent multilateral sanctions that have been imposed to 
 
140 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 82 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1776). 
141 See, e.g., China Defends Iran Oil Purchases After U.S. Sanctions, AL ARABIYA NEWS (June 12, 
2012), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/12/220202.html (quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Liu Weimin emphasizing that “China is opposed to one country imposing unilateral 
sanctions on another country in accordance with domestic law, let alone imposing sanctions on a third 
country”). 
142 In June of 2012, for example, China received a six-month reprieve from sanctions against 
financial transactions related to the purchase of Iranian oil.  See US Grants China Six-month Iran Oil 
Sanctions Reprieve, BBC NEWS (June 28, 2012 11:23 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
china-18639255. 
143 UANI Calls on China Classification Society to Stop Certifying Iranian Vessels, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 
3, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121003006617/en/UANI-Calls-China-
Classification-Society-Stop-Certifying. 
144 UANI Calls on Russian Maritime Register of Shipping to Stop Certifying Iranian Vessels, BUS. 
WIRE (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120815006317/en/UANI-
Calls-Russian-Maritime-Register-Shipping-Stop. 
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prevent it from further developing its illegal nuclear weapons program.”145 
The payoff for evasion, especially when it comes to oil sanctions, can 
be significant, and this can have important behavioral and predictive 
consequences.  In particular, “the existence of short-term capacity 
limitations, reservoir engineering constraints, and the finite resource base in 
the petroleum industry substantially attenuate the incentive to cheat.”146  
Markets arise wherever there is market demand, and through the broad 
extraterritorial application of the ITRA, the United States sought to prevent 
foreign entities from filling the commercial voids created by an exodus of 
American firms from the Iranian economy following the 1996 Sanctions 
Act and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act.147  But the failure of the ITRA 
with respect to compliance reflects a polarized discourse between the 
United States and the rest of the world.  While the United Nations and 
many member states support some form of sanctions against Iran, 
enforcement norms differ.148  For the ITRA to achieve its intended effect of 
isolating the Iranian economy and compelling Tehran to abandon their 
nuclear ambitions, compliance must be universal.  A multilateral approach 
that captures the cooperation of many powerful states within one 
international system would, in a sense, better “punish defections from the 
rules of the game.”149  With more nations in an enforcement coalition, 
fewer are left to circumvent Iran sanctions.150  Economic theory also 
suggests that sanctions imposed by allies, rather than adversaries, are often 
more effective.151 
Similarly, a significant part of this quest for uniformity will require 
the United States to enforce its sanctions without exception—something 
that it has yet to do.  A greater willingness to punish major U.S. trading 
partners for violations, including China, would also contribute to the 
cogency of the ITRA.  This is not to suggest that the economic sanctions on 
 
145 Id. 
146 James M. Griffin & Wiewen Xiong, Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC, 40 J.L. 
& ECON. 289, 313 (1997). 
147 See, e.g., ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, BRYAN GOLD, SAM KHAZAI & BRADLEY BOSSERMAN, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: SANCTIONS, 
ENERGY, ARMS CONTROL, AND REGIME CHANGE 82 (Apr. 19. 2013), available at http://csis.org/files/ 
publication/120124_Iran_Sanctions.pdf. 
148 See Lendman, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
149 Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation 
Counterproductive?, 54 INT’L ORG. 73, 74 (2000). 
150 Davis & Engerman, supra note 7, at 195. 
151 Id.  Using a conflict expectation model to predict the effectiveness of economic coercion in 
international relations, Professor Drezner concludes: “The target’s conflict expectations determine the 
magnitude of concessions.  Facing an adversarial sender, the target will be worried about the long-run 
implications of acquiescing.  Because it expects frequent conflicts, the target will be concerned about 
any concessions in the present undercutting its bargaining position in future interactions . . . . Ceteris 
paribus, targets will concede more to allies than adversaries.”  DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS 
PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4–5 (1999). 
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Iran are not stringent enough.  If anything, the ITRA’s blunt, unilateral 
approach threatens to alienate allies, corrode the cooperative framework, 
and invite “interstate rivalries.”152  Rather than make it more difficult for 
foreign countries to comply with the ITRA, a better approach would be to 
create “conditions for a return to good faith participation in the 
international monitoring system.”153  The United Nations is the most 
obvious forum for establishing a universal enforcement norm, and through 
mutuality of promise, any non-compliant actors or fringe markets can be 
more effectively regulated rather than unilaterally policed.154 
 
B.  Improved Reporting and Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
The ITRA’s unilateral approach also creates major problems for 
global commodity producers, bankers, insurers, and intermediaries.  Many 
foreign firms understand the broad contours of Sections 208 and 209, but 
few agree on the specifics.155  Accordingly, internal reporting standards for 
many independent foreign subsidiaries reflect consistency and quality 
issues.  With the ITRA and its accompanying surge in new reporting, 
however, the U.S. government will have even more difficulty verifying and 
following through on all of the information it receives.  This means that 
“the enforcement of violations is both variable and unpredictable.”156  By 
contrast, a coordinated international reporting system, one that uniformly 
collects and reviews financial information at the state level, would 
harmonize conflicting standards of compliance, increase monitoring 
capacity, and improve enforcement. 
 
C.  A Stimulus for Diplomatic Negotiations 
 
With major trading partners and buyers of Iranian crude in lockstep 
with the United States, the effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy could 
 
152 Cristian DeFrancia, Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive 
Measures, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 782–83 (2012). 
153 Id. 
154 But see Brandeis Institute for International Judges, Toward an International Rule of Law / 2010 
Report, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 201, 231 (2011) (finding that one “weakness in 
the U.N. system is that a permanent member of the Security Council can veto sanctions for non-
compliance—an option not open to a less powerful state”). 
155 Ben Knowles, How ITRA is Changing the Global Financial Landscape, TFR BLOG (Jan. 7, 
2013), http://www.tfreview.com/blog/how-itra-changing-global-financial-landscape.  For example, the 
ITRA’s definition of “own or control” with respect to foreign affiliates includes U.S. entities that 
actually or “otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the [foreign] entity.”  Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 218(a)(2)(C) (2012).  
The statute fails to define “otherwise control” and leaves a standard that appears highly fact-specific 
and open to competing interpretation. 
156 Knowles, supra note 155. 
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worsen.  Even if the country’s citizenry suffers, however, little suggests 
that those in power feel pressured to reconsider their nuclear weapons 
program.  For example, in February of 2013 and just six months after the 
ITRA became law, Iran announced that it was marching forward with its 
nuclear program by installing 180 new advanced centrifuges, a move that 
accelerates the process for uranium refinement.157  Not surprisingly, the 
White House responded by threatening “further pressure and isolation.”158  
Such discourse reflects a cycle of mistrust and escalation that foreshadows 
the United States’ drawn-out, and ineffective, unilateral strategy.  While 
Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaee, suggests 
that any successful negotiation between the two countries must include 
“mutual respect, respect for Iran’s national sovereignty, non-intervention in 
Iran’s domestic affairs, and [the] discarding [of a] two-track policy of 
pressure and engagement,”159 economic sanctions remain one of the last 
alternatives to direct military action.  As a necessary but insufficient means 
of achieving Iranian non-proliferation goals, the concern moving forward 
should be on the length, rather than the severity, of these restrictions.  By 
sealing off opportunities for evasion and non-compliance via a new, more 
rigorous multilateral agreement, vital industries in Iran will lose revenue 
more quickly.  The rial will depreciate, and inflation will drive the price of 
imports, foodstuffs, and other commodities through the roof.  If the Iranian 
government could find ways to temper the impact of sanctions before,160 a 
swift and exacting imposition of universal restraints could bring its 
economy to the brink of collapse sooner rather than later.  This, in turn, 
may force Iranian leadership to rethink its refusal to engage in serious 
diplomatic negotiations with both the United States and the United Nations. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Note has examined some of the legal and practical challenges 
that American sanctions regimes will face as the point of Iranian nuclear 
proliferation draws closer.  At present, the international community finds 
itself at a critical juncture where new diplomatic and coercive methods are 
necessary to punish Iran and some emboldened market actors.161  While the 
ITRA was intended to defy the disappointing history of non-proliferation 
policy and sanctions practice, the Act fails to achieve the uniform 
 
157 IAEA: Iran Installing Advanced Centrifuges, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/middleeast/2013/02/2013221224353882956.html. 
158 Id. 
159 Johan Kharabi, ‘Unprecedented’ Conversation Yields Proposals for US-Iran Negotiations, ASIA 
SOC’Y (Feb. 21, 2013), http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/unprecedented-conversation-yields-proposals-
us- iran-negotiations. 
160 Andrew Torchia, Analysis: Iran Economy Far From Collapse as Sanctions Tighten, REUTERS 
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE91J0SM20130220. 
161 See supra Part III.B. 
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application and enforcement that it needs in order to be truly effective.  
Issues of international legitimacy, early non-compliance and potential 
retaliatory action, increased exposure for non-U.S. subsidiaries, 
complications in parent corporation control and oversight, and severe 
economic harm to the Iranian populace only magnify an underlying truth—
that the ITRA ultimately fails because it is neither targeted nor 
cooperative.162  Even if the prospect of reaching international consensus for 
stringent, multilateral sanctions remains remote, the United States, if 
serious about talking Iran down from the nuclear cliff, must look beyond its 
unilateral measures and engage the international community in a realistic 
and timely way. 
 
 
162 KHAJEHPOUR ET AL., supra note 125, at 31 (concluding that a “pressure strategy that lacks the 
sophistication and flexibility to help unravel the dominant narrative in the sanctioned state and entice 
stakeholders to push for policy changes is unlikely to succeed and [is] potentially counter-productive”). 
